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I. THE PRE-GAME SHOW: AN INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1961, the revenue sharing system utilized
by The National Football League ("NFL") has been instrumental in
propelling the League to the forefront of professional sports in
America.1 In the early 1960s, Commissioner Pete Rozelle ushered in
an era of collectivism among the individual team owners that came to
define the NFL's economic approach for the next four decades. Relying
on the collective outlook that became known as the "League Think"
philosophy, Rozelle convinced the individual owners that by pooling
their resources and sharing their profits, they would be able to provide
a product that, as a whole, was much more valuable than the sum of
2
its parts.
The idea took off in 1961 when Rozelle successfully persuaded
the individual owners to give up their local television broadcasting
rights and instead sell all broadcasting rights together as a national
package; the proceeds were then split evenly among each NFL team. 3
From 1961 onward, the League's continued commitment to the equal
sharing of television revenues has remained the foundation of the
NFL's revenue sharing system. 4 Furthermore, the financial parity
that resulted from this collective philosophy enhanced the
competitiveness of the League as a whole, thereby fostering the
massive popularity still enjoyed by the League today. 5
For nearly forty years, the NFL's revenue sharing system
remained largely unchanged as NFL owners were content to rely on
the success that revenue sharing brought to the League as a whole. 6
During this period, the individual owners were completely satisfied
with the revenue they received under the revenue sharing system, and
they were largely unconcerned with trying to garner any type of
1.

Sanjay Jose' Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: FranchiseFree Agency and the New

Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (1996).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
See Stefan Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive? The All-For-One, One-For-All Ethos
of Pro Football Has Made It the Envy of Other Sports; The NFL Is Fighting To Make Sure It
Stays That Way, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at Ri [hereinafter Fatsis, Can Socialism
Survive?].
5.
Mullick, supra note 1, at 12.
6.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4.
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competitive financial advantage over their fellow owners.7 In recent
years, however, there has been a significant erosion in the NFL's
collective mentality largely due to the development of sources of
unshared revenue, known as "local revenue," which enables certain
teams to gain a competitive advantage by utilizing this unshared
revenue that is unavailable to some of their less fortunate
8
counterparts.
Although the NFL and its member-clubs shared more than
eighty percent of the roughly $5.5 billion in total League revenue
generated during the 2004 season, there has recently been a dramatic
increase in unshared local revenue, which is threatening the future
financial parity of the League. 9 Furthermore, because most sources of
local revenue are directly tied to a team's stadium ownership and its
market size, the League's current revenue sharing system has created
an environment in which the most profitable teams are better situated
to capitalize on unshared local revenue, thereby exacerbating a
widening revenue gap between those teams at the top and those at the
bottom.
The current revenue sharing system utilizes a two pronged
approach to distribute League revenue, but it also carves out an
exception for sources of unshared local revenue. The two prongs of the
revenue sharing system can be distinguished by the source of revenue
and amount shared under each category, as well as the various
documents that govern their existence. The first category comprises
the sharing of revenue generated by licensing and sponsorship
agreements, and this category is governed by a recently approved
accord among NFL owners known as the "Master Agreement."1 0 The
second category covers the sharing of all revenue that is generated by
the actual playing of games on the field, and this category is governed
by a combination of provisions in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
("CBA") and the NFL Constitution and Bylaws ("NFL Constitution").1 1

7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.; Mullick, supra note 1, at 1.
10.
The Master Agreement is basically an extension of the NFL Trust, which was a
virtually identical agreement among owners regarding the sharing of licensing revenue
with origins dating back to the emergence of the "League Think" philosophy in the 1960s.
See Stefan Fatsis, Dallas Owner Again Challenges NFL's Licensing, WALL ST. J, Apr. 2,
2004, at B3 [hereinafter Fatsis, Dallas Owner]. Cf. Daniel Kaplan, Tagliabue: NFL Trust
Survival 'a Done Deal,' STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Mar. 29, 2004, at 1

[hereinafter Kaplan, Tagliabue].
11.

See NFL CONST. art. 10.3; see also NFL, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AGREEMENT 2002-2008 art. XXIV, §§ 1-4, available at http://www.nflpa.org/Agents/
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This second category, which includes television broadcasting deals and
gate receipts from stadium attendance, is responsible for a strong
majority of the total revenue shared between the League and its
12
individual franchises.
Furthermore, while these categories can be viewed as two
components in a greater revenue sharing system, it is important to
note that they were not developed together, but instead are separate
outgrowths of the NFL's greater collective mentality. As a result, the
system does not necessarily fit flawlessly together, which makes any
comprehensive analysis of the overall system a somewhat difficult
task. Nevertheless, under their respective governing documents, both
categories treat League revenue in a similar fashion by distinguishing
those revenue sources that are subject to sharing from those local
revenue sources that remain unshared. While this distinction is not as
readily apparent in the Master Agreement, the relevant provisions
within the CBA clearly separate total League revenue into "Defined
Gross Revenue" ("DGR"), which is subject to revenue sharing, and
"Excluded DGR," which is not. 13
In addition to this comprehensive approach to revenue sharing,
the NFL's greater financial model also includes a salary cap system
that is similarly intended to preserve the League's financial equality
and to guarantee the players their fair share of League profits.
Although these two semi-socialist initiatives can arguably be
differentiated as separate and distinct financial systems, revenue
sharing and the salary cap are in many ways inseparably connected,
and therefore any attempt at a complete analysis of one system
necessarily requires a simultaneous examination of the other.
The salary cap system, which sets both a floor and a ceiling on
what a team can (or must) spend on player salaries, is interrelated
with the League's revenue sharing system because each year the
salary cap's floor and ceiling are set at a percentage of DGR. 14
main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete [hereinafter CBA]; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?,
supra note 4, at R2; Ira Miller, Revenue-sharing Rates as a Hot Topic, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Mar. 28, 2004 at, C2 [hereinafter Miller, Revenue-sharingRates].
12.
Miller, Revenue-sharingRates, supra note 11, at C2.
13.
See NFL CONST. art. 10.3; CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, § 1(a); Fatsis, Can
Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R2. For a detailed discussion of DGR and Excluded
DGR see discussion infra Part.II.C.2.
14.
See CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, §§ 2-4; see also Jarrett Bell, NFL Tug-ofWar Over Revenue, USA TODAY, July 6, 2004, at 1C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra
note 4, at R5. The salary cap system, which has been widely credited with maintaining the
competitive parity within the NFL, is not usually considered to be part and parcel with the
League's greater revenue sharing system, and instead is normally regarded as a separate
and distinct financial model. The salary cap system, however, is also responsible for
governing how League revenue is shared with players, and therefore should also be
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Therefore, much like under the revenue sharing system, Excluded
DGR is not considered when calculating the salary cap's annual floor
and ceiling. This characteristic of the salary cap system has recently
attracted significant criticism from the NFL Players Association
("NFLPA") because it essentially deprives the players of a portion of
League revenue that they would otherwise be guaranteed by the
salary cap's floor. 15 As a result, the treatment of local revenue has
become a major hurdle in the on-going negotiations to extend the
current CBA, which expires after the 2007 season. 16 Finally, it is also
important to examine how the growth in local revenue has contributed
to the salary cap's failure and to the widening revenue disparities,
which together severely threaten the future financial viability of the
lowest-revenue teams.
This note argues that the League must reform the current
revenue sharing model in order to correct the widening revenue gap
between the lowest and highest revenue teams, which if not
adequately addressed soon could severely impair the future popularity
and success of the NFL. Part II describes the emergence of revenue
sharing in the NFL; its evolution due to past challenges initiated by
profit-oriented owners; and the details of the current revenue sharing
system in place today. Part III establishes how the emergence of
unshared "local revenue" has eroded the NFL's collective mentality,
thereby causing a variety of problems for the League. Part IV
proposes a solution intended to effectively alleviate the League's
growing financial inequalities while at the same time maintaining the
important incentives created by a reasonable amount of unshared
revenue. In particular, this section proposes a redistributive formula
that allows for a healthy level of unshared local revenue, but
simultaneously
prevents
extreme
financial
inequalities
by
redistributing excessive local revenue to those teams most in need.
On March 8, 2006, just before this note went to press, the NFL
owners and the NFLPA reached a last-minute labor agreement, which
included significant reforms to the revenue sharing system, and
considered as part of the NFL's greater revenue sharing system. See discussion infra Part

III.D explaining how revenue sharing and the salary cap are interrelated.
15.
See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Impasse on CBA Likely to Reach 2006, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Nov. 28, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Kaplan, NFL
Impasse]; Liz Mullen & Daniel Kaplan, NFL Sides Agree: Deal Must be Done March 1,
STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Jan. 16, 2005, at 3 [hereinafter Mullen &

Kaplan, NFL Sides Agree]; Jarrett Bell, NFL Thg-of- War, supra note 14, at 1C.
16.
See discussion infra Part.III.D describing the NFLPA's position regarding the
sharing of local revenue, and the tentative agreement recently achieved by the League and
the NFLPA to share "total football revenue."
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therefore has important implications for much of the analysis
17
presented in this note.
With their backs against the wall, the owners were forced to
postpone the official start of the 2006 season and extend the March
3rd free agency deadline in order to find a way to reach an agreement
that now preserves the current salary cap system, which would have
otherwise expired at the official start of the 2006 season.' 8 Largely
surrendering to the demands of the players union, the owners not only
approved a six-year collective bargaining agreement, but they also
reached a corresponding revenue-sharing deal, which the NFLPA had
astutely required as a condition of its final offer for reaching a new
labor pact.19 Although the details of the new revenue sharing plan are
still emerging, the owners appear to have adopted a plan that is
extremely similar in its general approach to the redistributive formula
that this note proposes as a solution to the various problems
20
associated with local revenue and the widening revenue gap.
While portions of this note's analysis may have been rendered
somewhat moot by the League's recent course of action, these
developments also largely validate many of the arguments raised
throughout the analysis. Furthermore, as a whole, this note remains
pertinent in its comprehensive analysis of the NFL revenue sharing
system. In particular, the League's newly adopted plan appears to be
somewhat of a quick-fix, which will still face many of the same issues
raised in this note, and has already garnered criticism from both ends
of the revenue sharing debate. 2 1 Finally, it is worth noting that the
new guard of profit-oriented owners, who strongly opposed the idea of
increased revenue sharing, appear to have reluctantly embraced the
"League Think" philosophy by putting the League ahead of
17.
Daniel Kaplan, NFL Owners to Set Revenue-Sharing Plan, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 2006 at 1 [hereinafter Kaplan, NFL Owners]; Daniel
Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise in Dallas,STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL,
Mar. 13, 2006 at 1 [hereinafter Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise]; Liz Mullen, Winding
Road To NFL Labor Peace, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Mar. 13, 2006
at 1 [hereinafter Mullen, Winding Road].
18.
Before the new labor agreement was approved, the now-defunct CBA would
have lasted through the 2007 season, but the current 2006 season would have been the last
one subject to the salary cap, which would have therefore expired along with the start of
the 2006 season.
19.
Kaplan, NFL Owners, supra note 17, at 1; Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise,
supra note 17, at 1; Mullen, Winding Road, supra note 17, at 1.
20.
See Kaplan, NFL Owners, supra note 17, for a detailed description of the new
revenue sharing plan as of March 20, 2006.
21.
See Kaplan, NFL Owners, supra note 17; Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise,
supra note 17 (discussing unhappy owners, who are already expressing various criticisms
of this new plan, including some of the lowest-revenue owners who have criticized its
failure to include all local revenue within the revenue shared between teams).
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themselves, and recognizing that the value of their individual
franchise is directly tied to the overall health of the League.

II. FIRST AND TEN: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENUE SHARING IN THE
NFL - FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE LEAGUE'S CURRENT SYSTEM
A. The Emergence of the "League Think" Philosophy
The NFL's collective "League Think" philosophy emerged in the
22
early 1960's as the brain child of then Commissioner, Pete Rozelle.
Rozelle convinced the League's founding owners, such as George Halas
of the Chicago Bears and Wellington Mara 23 of the New York Giants,
to relinquish their control over local television broadcasting rights,
and instead combine these rights into a national package. 24 According
to Rozelle's plan, the League would then sell this national package to
the television networks, and the proceeds of the sale would be split
evenly among each NFL franchise. 25 Rozelle argued that by pooling
resources and sharing revenue, the "League Think" philosophy would
stabilize the competitive balance within the League, thereby making
its product more marketable over the long run; and as a result,
ensuring the viability of the League as a whole. 26 Explaining that the
profitability of each individual team was necessarily tied to the
success of the League as a whole, Rozelle convinced the owners that
their individual profits would increase by putting the interests of the
27
League ahead of their own.
The NFL owners ultimately agreed to sell their television
rights to CBS as a national package, but the resulting contract
between the NFL and CBS was voided by a 1961 federal circuit court
26
decision finding that the contract violated antitrust laws.
22.
See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3; Mullick, supra note 1,
at 1.
23.
The author would like to pay his respect to the family of the late Giants owner
Wellington Mara, who passed away on October 25, 2005 at the age of 89. In addition to
being a wonderful person, Mara has been widely recognized as one of the NFL's most
influential and beloved owners, whose foresight helped pave the way for the League's
revenue sharing system and the resulting success still enjoyed by the NFL today. See
Daniel Kaplan, Pro Football Loses a Giant Leader, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS
JOURNAL, Oct.31, 2005, at 4 [hereinafter Kaplan, Pro Football Loses].
24.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3.

25.

Id.

26.
Mullick, supra note 1, at 1.
27.
Id. at 1-2.
28.
See United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445, 446-47 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Fatsis,
supra note 4, at R3; see also WTWV, Inc. v. NFL, 678 F.2d 142, 144 (11th Cir. 1982)
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Responding to the circuit court's decision, seventy-two days later
Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act, which enabled
professional sports leagues to negotiate television deals as single
units, thereby creating an antitrust exemption that has revolutionized
the sports industry. 29 In 1962, armed with the recently enacted
antitrust exemption, the NFL and CBS entered into a contract
whereby CBS paid the NFL $4.65 million per year for two years in
exchange for the exclusive rights to broadcast all NFL games played
during that period. 30 As a result, the popularity of the league
exploded with television ratings soaring fifty percent in the second
year of the contract. 31 Furthermore, the NFL's next contract with
CBS reflected the League's rapidly growing popularity through a
payout of $14.1 million per year, more than triple its previous
contract.32
Over the next two decades, the NFL continued to grow,
especially with the 1970 merger of the NFL and its upstart rival, the
American Football League ("AFL"). 33 Despite the League's continued
growth, however, the NFL's business model and that of the individual
teams changed very little. 34 Throughout the 1980s, the NFL owners
were content to sit back and collect their ever-increasing, equal shares
of the national television deals, 35 while also sharing the gate receipts
generated by crowded stadiums. 36 The profits accumulated by the
individual teams were heavily dependent on the revenue generated by
the league as a whole, and the individual owners were not overly
concerned with gaining a competitive advantage by increasing their
own team's relative revenues. 37 According to current Baltimore
Ravens President Dick Cass, " 'There were not as many revenue
opportunities . . . .' Most owners 'didn't control the stadiums, they
didn't control concessions, they didn't control parking. Sports
(describing the history behind the decision in U.S. v. NFL and stating that the contract
with CBS was actually meant to mimic a similar broadcasting agreement already arranged
by the NFL's upstart competitor, the American Football League ("AFL")).
29.
WTWV, 678 F.2d at 144; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3.
30.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
In 1982, the NFL signed national TV deals with CBS, NBC, and ABC, which
when combined generated a total of $1.89 billion in revenue for the NFL through the 1986
season.. NFL TV Rights: The Escalation of Television Rights Fees for the NFL:, SPORTS
ILLISTRATED.coM, Nov. 8, 2004, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/football/nfl/wires/l/
08/2024.ap.fbn.nfl.tv.rights.chart.0268 (on file with author).
36.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3.
37.
See Mullick, supranote 1, at 12-13.
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sponsorships weren't a big deal.' "38
opportunities for teams to generate
nonexistent, and the only way
profitability relative to other teams
salaries .39

Under this business model, the
their own revenue were virtually
for teams to maximize their
was to cut costs-namely, player

B. The Evolution of the Revenue Sharing System: Historical
Challenges
While the general structure of the NFL's cooperative approach
remains an integral part of the League today, challenges to the
League's collective mentality, which began in the 1990s, have
revolutionized the predominant business model currently utilized by
the NFL and its owners.
As current NFL Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue explains, the NFL remains committed to maintaining its
cooperative structure because " '[c]learly, the attractiveness of the
league is not dependent on any one team or small group of teams ....
It's a total league. That was the philosophy from the early '60s
onward, and it's continued.' O4 The business model followed by the
NFL owners, on the other hand, has drastically evolved in recent
years due largely to an emerging faction of owners who believe that
teams should be given greater control over their revenue in order to
41
better market themselves.
One of the first and most influential owners to challenge the
NFL's "League Think" philosophy was Jerry Jones, an oil and gas
tycoon who paid $140 million for the Dallas Cowboys franchise in
1989.42 Initially, Jones focused his confrontations with the League
over the issue of national sponsorship and marketing deals, which at
that time were exclusively controlled by the League's profitable arm,
NFL Properties. 43
Jones criticized his take from the national
sponsorship deals as inadequate for the marketing power of his
particular franchise. 44 Jones basically felt that he could do a better
job of marketing his team by negotiating local deals, instead of relying

38.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3.
39.
Mullick, supranote 1, at 13.
40.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3.
41.
See id. at 3-6.
42.
Id. at 3.
43.
See Miller, Revenue-sharing Rates, supra note 11, at C2.
44.
See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R3-R4; Miller, RevenuesharingRates, supra note 11, at C2.
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on the League to market his team as part of the total package of the
45
League.
In 1995, Jones directly challenged the League by entering into
local sponsorship deals with Pepsi and Nike, despite the League's
supposedly exclusive deals with Coke and Players Inc., the licensing
arm of the NFLPA. 46 The brash move by Jones prompted the NFL to
file a law suit against the Cowboys for $300 million. 47 The League
labeled Jones's conduct as "ambush marketing deals" and sought a
ruling that would enjoin the Cowboys from violating their agreements
with NFL Properties regarding the NFL's exclusive control over team
logos. 48 Jones responded by filing a $700 million counterclaim against
the League, accusing the NFL of preventing teams from marketing
themselves. 49 In late 1996, the two sides ultimately reached a
settlement that allowed the Cowboys to keep their new sponsorship
deals. More importantly, it opened the door for other NFL teams to
50
secure their own local sponsorship deals.
Jones's ability to successfully challenge the League in the area
of local sponsorship not only created a new source of unshared revenue
for individual teams, but more significantly, it marked the beginning
of an erosion in the collective mentality that has dominated the
League for so many years. 51 The current ramifications of this
settlement between Jones and the NFL are illustrated by the coexisting marketing deals currently held by both individual teams and
the League as a whole. For example, Pepsi and Coors are now the
"official" soft drink and beer of the NFL, giving each company the
right to use the NFL logo and the logos of the 32 individual franchises
in national advertising. 52 Individual teams, however, now may
arrange their own local deals with other vendors, such as Coke and
Budweiser. 53 While Jones's victory over the NFL was limited to the
area of sponsorship and marketing deals, his incentive-based
arguments have gained some support from a few of the other owners,
and the League has ultimately been forced to re-evaluate the twoprong current revenue sharing system.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Sam Farmer, NFL Reviews Matter of Trust, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at D1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

51.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R4.
52.
Id.; see Fatsis, Dallas Owner, supra note 10, at B3.
53.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R4; Fatsis, Dallas Owner,
supra note 10, at B3 (stating that Coke is poured in 19 NFL stadiums whereas Pepsi is
only poured in 12 stadiums).
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C. The CurrentRevenue Sharing System in the NFL
The current revenue sharing system in place in the NFL today
can be separated into two basic subsections or categories. The first
category comprises the sharing of revenue generated by licensing
agreements such as sponsorships and marketing deals, as well as
League merchandise sales. This licensing element is governed by the
recently enacted "Master Agreement," which is an extension of the
"NFL Trust," an agreement between owners with origins dating back
to the collective mentality that emerged in the 1960s. 54 Under the
Master Agreement, the NFL retains most of its control over the team
logos used by the 32 individual franchises, and the League has
reserved some of its power to determine how each individual franchise
can use its own logo. 5 5 The new agreement, however, does not simply
preserve the status quo regarding local sponsorship deals, but instead
also gives individual teams greater freedom to control their own local
marketing revenue. 5 6 Nevertheless, because the Master Agreement
was not unanimously approved by all the team owners, there is some
uncertainty about whether the agreement will be binding on those
57
owners who voted against it.
The second more commonly known category of the revenue
sharing system is comprised of all the revenue that is generated by
the actual playing of the games on the field. 58 Unlike the Master
Agreement, this category is not governed by a single document, but
instead by a combination of provisions from both the NFL
Constitution and the CBA. This second category, which includes the
television deals covering the rights to broadcast NFL games as well as
the gate receipts generated by stadium attendance, comprises the
strong majority of the total revenue shared among individual NFL
59
franchises.
Although this second category generates the vast majority of
the revenue shared by NFL teams, both aspects of the revenue

54.
See Fatsis, Dallas Owner, supra note 10, at B3.
55.
Id. Under the NFL Trust, the League actually owned each team's logo, and
teams had to get League permission before entering into their own sponsorship deals.
Kaplan, Tagliabue, supra note 10, at 1. Under the newly enacted Master Agreement, teams
now legally own their own logo, which was intended to insulate the Master Agreement from
any legal challenges by those owners who voted against it. Id. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 81-84.
56.
See id.
57.
See Farmer, supra note 45, at D1; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4,
at R1.
58.
See CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, §1(a)(i)(1).
59.
See Miller, Revenue-sharing Rates, supra note 11, at C2.
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sharing system represent the collective "League Think" philosophy
60
that has played such a central role in the success of the NFL.
Despite their common goal, however, the monetary disparity between
these two categories cannot be ignored. For example, under the
system in place at the end of the 2004 season, the licensing element
only generated between $4 and $5 million for each team, whereas the
61
national television deals alone generated $80 million per team.
Notwithstanding the actual disparity in the contribution that each
category makes to the overall revenue shared by the individual NFL
teams, it is important that they be recognized as part of the same
general system because they are inseparably connected by the
League's greater collective mentality. Furthermore, as a number of
owners noted when voting in favor of the Master Agreement, its
approval was a significant gesture in reaffirming the importance
62
placed upon the League's commitment to revenue sharing.
1. The Master Agreement's Contribution to the Revenue Sharing
System
The new Master Agreement determines which categories of
licensing are exclusively controlled by the League and conversely, how
individual franchises can supplement their income with unshared
Under the Master
licensing and sponsorship agreements. 63
Agreement, the most significant sponsorship category exclusively
controlled by the League is on-field sponsorship deals. 64 The NFL
currently has on-field deals with Gatorade, the Pepsi-owned sports
drink, and Motorola Inc., which supplies head sets worn by NFL
coaches. 65 These two companies are the only corporate sponsors whose
66
brands are allowed on NFL sidelines.
While the Master Agreement clearly restricts the ability of
individual owners to enter into sponsorship deals that might conflict
with League-wide sponsors, the agreement also recognizes the victory
Jerry Jones achieved in 1996 by providing some flexibility for
67
individual teams to negotiate their own local sponsorship deals.
60.

Id.

61.

Farmer, supra note 45, at D1; Miller, Revenue-sharing Rates, supra note 11, at

C2.
62.
63.
10, at 1.
64.
65.

66.
67.

See Miller, Revenue-sharingRates, supra note 11, at C2.
See Fatsis, Dallas Owner, supra note 10, at B3; Kaplan, Tagliabue, supra note
Fatsis, Dallas Owner, supra note 10, at B3.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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These local sponsorship deals serve as an important source of
unshared revenue, which has increasingly drawn the attention of
team owners seeking to obtain a competitive advantage over the rest
of the League. According to the Master Agreement, the League can
sell the rights to use the 32 team logos collectively only within an
exclusively League-controlled sponsorship area. 68
Otherwise, the
individual teams legally own their own logos and are free to negotiate
their own local marketing deals using their logos. 69 Furthermore,
teams can establish their own retail shops to sell team apparel, and
unlike the massive quantity of merchandise sold by the League itself,
any apparel sold at team stores generates unshared revenue
streams. 70 Therefore, teams that create their own retail shops can
take advantage of their marketability by keeping all of the revenue
generated by these stores.
Under the Master Agreement, the individual franchises and
the NFL itself equally share all the revenue that is generated by
League merchandise sales and exclusive League-wide sponsorship
deals. 71 In recent years, the individual teams received between four
and five million dollars a year, but that figure is expected to at least
double under contracts already signed by the League. 72 The NFL
agreed to extend its sponsorship agreement with Pepsi in 2002, under
which Pepsi is obligated to pay $440 million in rights, fees,
advertising, and marketing through 2011. 73 Pepsi will pay the League
an average of sixteen million dollars a year, which is about one-third
more than under its previous contract; other advertising obligations
74
could push the total value of the deal over $550 million.
Furthermore, the League also recently extended its sponsorship deals

68.
See id.
69.
See id. As further explored below, this is a somewhat significant difference
between the Master Agreement and its predecessor, the NFL Trust. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 81-84.
70.
See Daniel Kaplan, Divide on Revenue Sharing Persists in NFL Trust Debate,
STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Feb. 23, 2004, at 1 [hereinafter Kaplan,

Divide on Revenue Sharing]; Farmer, supra note 45, at D1 (stating that New England,
Washington, Dallas, and Tampa Bay have all established retail shops to sell team gear).
71.
Kaplan, Divide on Revenue Sharing, supra note 70, at 1; Kaplan, Tagliabue,
supra note 10, at 1.
72.
Miller, Revenue-sharing Rates, supra note 11, at C3; see Jeff Duncan, Licensing
Deal to Continue As Is, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 31, 2004, at 2. The statistics used above to
illustrate the monetary value of lioensing revenue shared in recent years were calculated
under the NFL Trust not the Master Agreement, but overall numbers should not be
significantly different under the Master Agreement.
73.
Fatsis, Dallas Owner, supra note 10, at B3.
74.
Id.
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with Gatorade and Visa, which should further contribute to the
75
increasing amount of shared licensing revenue.
Despite mounting concern that there should have been an
overhaul of the entire revenue sharing system before proceeding with
the Master Agreement, in the spring of 2004 the owners passed the
fifteen year-long agreement by a vote of twenty-six to three (with
three abstentions).7 6 Prior to the vote, the Raiders, Redskins and
Cowboys, which at the time were the three teams expected to vote
against the agreement, all expressed their belief that they would be
77
bound only if they voted in favor of the agreement.
Following the vote, however, the question still remains
whether the agreement is binding on those owners who voted against
it. Jerry Jones has publicly maintained that he is not bound by the
Master Agreement because he voted against it.78 The League, on the
other hand, expressed the converse view that any vote on matters of
League policy requires a three-quarters majority, or twenty-four team
owners, at which point the policy takes effect and becomes binding on
all NFL teams. 79 Other team owners have supported the League's
position. As Cleveland Browns President Carmen Policy explained,
"[a]nybody who feels a league, a partnership, cannot bind itself by a
80
three-fourths vote is calling for anarchy."
Furthermore, the League specifically structured the Master
Agreement to inoculate its ultimate approval from any legal
challenges by owners like Jerry Jones. 8 ' In particular, the Master
Agreement gives individual franchises ownership of their own logos,
and teams no longer need League approval before entering local
sponsorship deals.8 2 Additionally, the League also tried to placate
owners like Jones by expanding the geographic constraints placed on
each team's marketing territory, an area within which a given team is

75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.; see Miller, Revenue-sharingRates, supra note 11, at C2.

79.

Id.

80.
81.

Miller, Revenue-sharing Rates, supra note 11, at C2.
Kaplan, Tagliabue, supra note 10, at 1.

82.

Id.

Miller, Revenue-sharing Rates, supra note 11, at C2. Oakland Raiders President
Amy Trask articulated the Raiders' position when she said, "[o]ur general counsel has
advised the league that on April 1 [2004] the right to our marks and logos reverts to us."
Kaplan, Tagliabue, supra note 10, at 1.
78.
Fatsis, Dallas Owner, supra note 10, at B3 (mentioning that Jones said that
turning over marketing rights to the League has been an individual club decision in the
past, and quoting Jones as saying, "[league-wide deals] are well and good as long as each
club, of its own volition, participates in those deals .... I'm saying I have my logos and
marks and can do what I want with them.").
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free to enter into their own local sponsorship deals.8 3 Previously,
teams were prevented from marketing beyond a seventy-five mile
radius around their home city, but the Master Agreement now allows
teams to market throughout their entire state, provided they do not
reach within a seventy-five mile radius around an in-state
competitor's city.8 4 When considering these characteristics of the
Master Agreement, it would seem that there is not an especially great
probability of an owner challenging the Agreement. It is impossible,
however, to predict whether an owner like Jerry Jones might be
offered a deal attractive enough to entice him into challenging the
Master Agreement.
In the end, the question of whether the Master Agreement is
binding on those owners who voted against it remains unanswered,
but if the conflict were to come to a head, there could be major
ramifications throughout the League. The likelihood that Jones would
prevail on such a challenge is relatively slim because the argument
articulated by the League and owners like Policy has plenty of merit.
Furthermore, there are policy reasons why Jones' argument should
fail, such as preventing an increase in significant economic
inequalities, which threaten the competitive balance that has been so
85
instrumental to the NFL's success.
Although there is no clear answer regarding what would
happen if Jones challenges the Master Agreement, League sources
have speculated that Jones might initiate a challenge by seeking a
Cowboys sponsor which conflicts with an exclusive category reserved
for League-wide action under the Master Agreement.8 6 A likely
scenario would be for Jones to negotiate a local on-field sponsor that
conflicts with the League-wide on-field sponsorship deals already
negotiated with companies like Gatorade and Motorola.8 7 If Jones
indeed decides to challenge the Master Agreement, the League would
most likely respond by filing a lawsuit against Jones for violating the
terms of the Agreement. The question would then become whether a
three-quarters vote by the team owners is in fact binding on every
team regardless of whether a specific team voted against the Master

83.
Id.; Daniel Kaplan, Texans Lead The NFL in Marketing Statewide, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Sept. 13, 2004, at 3 [hereinafter Kaplan, Texans
Lead].
84.
Kaplan, Tagliabue,supra note 10, at 1; Kaplan, Texans Lead, supra note 83, at
3.
85.
See discussion infra Part III.B for a description of the widening revenue gap in
the NFL and its potential consequences for the success of the League.
86.
Fatsis, DallasOwner, supra note 10, at B3.
87.
Id.
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Agreement. Finally, in the event that Jones successfully challenges
the limitations of the Master Agreement, there would not only be a
substantial monetary loss for the NFL's revenue sharing system, but
more importantly, it would create a symbolic rift in the foundation of
the League's revenue sharing philosophy.
2. The Second Category of the Revenue Sharing System: Television
Revenue and Gate Receipts.
The second category of the revenue sharing system, which
comprises the vast majority of the total amount of revenue shared
each year, consists of all the revenue generated by the actual games
on the field. This general subsection of the revenue sharing system is
governed by a series of provisions in both the CBA and the NFL
Constitution. The CBA establishes "Defined Gross Revenue" ("DGR"),
as revenue composed of "all sources, whether known or unknown,
derived from, relating to or arising out of the performance of players
in NFL football games."8 8

Furthermore, in defining DGR, the CBA

identifies those sources of revenue that are explicitly included and
excluded in DGR.8 9 This distinction between DGR and Excluded DGR
plays an extremely important role in the revenue sharing system
because those sources of revenue that fall within the definition of DGR
are shared among the 32 NFL franchises, whereas the individual
franchise generating the Excluded DGR keeps all of that revenue.90
The two major revenue sources that are explicitly set forth in
the definition of DGR are: (1) the proceeds from the sale of television
broadcasting rights and (2) "gate receipts . . . including ticket revenue

from 'luxury boxes,' suites[,] and premium seating subject to gate
receipt sharing among NFL Teams."9 '
88.
CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, § 1(a).
89.
See id., art. XXIV, § 1(a)(i)-(iii).
90.
While the CBA does not explicitly state that DGR is meant to establish the
revenue sources subject to the revenue sharing system, that implication may be inferred
when the provisions of the CBA relating to DGR are considered in relation to the CBA as a
whole and to the applicable provisions of the NFL Constitution. Nor does the CBA
expressly state that Excluded DGR is not subject to the revenue sharing system, but that
assertion may similarly be inferred by considering the CBA as a whole. DGR also plays an
important role in establishing the NFL's salary cap, which has had a huge impact on the
ability of low-revenue teams to compete with their wealthier counterparts. Despite the
salary cap's intention of helping to level the playing field for lower-revenue teams, the cap
has actually allowed an increase in the inequalities that exist for lower-revenue teams. See
discussion infra Part III.B.
91.
CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, § 1(a)(i)(1)-(2) (emphasis added); see NFL
CONST. art. 10.3 (stating, "[a]ll regular season (and preseason network) television income
will be divided equally among all member clubs of the League"); Fatsis, Can Socialism
Survive?, supra note 4, at R2.
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While the equal sharing of television broadcasting rights is
relatively straightforward, the sharing of gate receipts is more
complex and deserves further explanation. First, it is imperative to
distinguish between "ticket revenue" from luxury boxes, which is
"subject to gate receipt sharing among NFL teams," and non-ticket
luxury box revenue, which is not subject to revenue sharing, and is
therefore coveted by owners as a source of supplemental unshared
revenue. 92 This distinction is based on the idea that luxury boxes can
be sold in such a way that they are not considered part of normal
ticket sales, and thus are not considered gate receipts subject to
93
revenue sharing.
Next, it is important to establish the precise manner in which
gate receipts subject to revenue sharing are actually shared among
the individual franchises. The NFL Constitution provides, "The home
club shall deliver to the League office the greater of $30,000 for each
regular season and preseason game, or [forty percent] of the gross
receipts after the following deductions . . . ."94 While this provision
establishes a floor of $30,000 that must be shared by the home team
for every game, in today's market, forty percent of gross receipts will
invariably exceed $30,000, thereby automatically triggering the forty
percent option. 95 Under the old system of gate receipt sharing, the
ticket revenue for a particular game was shared roughly sixty-forty
between the home and visiting team respectively with none of the
ticket revenue reaching beyond the two teams participating in that
96
particular game.
Although it would appear that gate receipts should be shared
according to the sixty-forty split, certain deductions afforded to the
home team cause the visiting team's share to diminish to thirty-four
percent of gross receipts. The NFL Constitution establishes that in
addition to deductions for federal, state, and municipal taxes on ticket
sales, the home team is allowed a significant deduction for "stadium
rental allowance equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the gross receipts

92.

See CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, § 1(a)(i), (iii); Mullick, supra note 1, at 15-

17.

93.
See discussion infra Part III.A explaining the role that unshared non-ticket
luxury box revenue plays in the revenue sharing system.
94.
NFL CONST. art. 19.1(A).
95.
See Alan Ostfield, Seat License Revenue in the National Football League:
Shareable or Not?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 599, 604 n.22 (1995) (stating that for the

$30,000 option to kick in, gross receipts would have to be less than approximately $89,000,
which is extremely unlikely considering that the average gross receipts for 1990-1995 was
around $1.5 million).
96.
Id. at 603-04.
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after deducting the taxes."9 7 As a result of these deductions, the home
team ends up giving the League thirty-four percent of the gross
receipts for each home game (forty percent of the eighty-five percent
remaining after the deduction for the stadium rental allowance). 9
Under the old system of gate receipt sharing, which was in place
through the 2001 season, the League would then remit the thirty-four
percent directly to the visiting team that played in that particular
game. 99

In 2001, however, the NFL adopted a resolution amending its
Constitution with the following language, "beginning with the 2002
NFL season, all regular season and preseason game visiting team
shares shall be pooled and shared equally among the 32 Member
Clubs." 10 0 This amendment to the revenue sharing of gate receipts
should increase the redistributive effect of the League's revenue
sharing system, and serves as a further indication of the NFL's
commitment to the "League Think" philosophy. Under the old system,
a popular team like the Dallas Cowboys could take advantage of the
sellout crowds that it helped draw to opposing stadiums by keeping
the entire thirty-four percent of gate receipts for itself. Conversely,
perennial cellar-dwellers like the Arizona Cardinals, who drew far
smaller crowds while on the road, experienced a competitive
disadvantage because their visiting team share ("VTS") was
undoubtedly smaller than that of the Cowboys. By pooling each team's
VTS, and then redistributing the total amount equally among the
individual franchises, the 2001 modification of gate receipt revenue
sharing should help ensure greater financial equality throughout the
league.
In opposition to this redistributive effect, financially-minded
owners like Jerry Jones would argue that individual teams should be
able to take advantage of their marketability, and should not be forced
to carry the burden of less marketable teams. Despite the apparent
justification for such an argument, the redistribution of revenue from
teams at the top to teams at the bottom has become necessary for the
continued economic success of the League; especially because the
current economic inequality in the NFL has reached such critical

97.
98.

NFL CONST. art. 19.1(A)(1)-(2).
See Ostfield, supra note 95, at 603-04.

99.

Id.

100.
NFL, NFL RES. G-1 (2001) (stating that "the term 'visiting team share' shall
mean the portion of gross receipts currently required (in the absence of a waiver) to be paid
to visiting clubs under Article 19.1(A) of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws in respect of
regular season games").
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levels that the future viability of lower-revenue teams is in serious
doubt.101
3. Television Revenue: The Foundation of the NFL Revenue Sharing
System
The two major revenue sources explicitly identified in DGR,
television revenue and gate receipts, compose the entire second
category of the revenue sharing system. As previously noted, these
two revenue streams generate the vast majority of the League's
shared revenue, which amounted to a total sharing of more than
eighty percent of the approximately $5.5 billion in total League
revenue from the 2004 season. 10 2 While gate receipts undoubtedly
play a critical role in the League's revenue sharing system, it is the
national television deals that operate as the heart and soul of revenue
sharing in the NFL.
From the first equally shared national television deal arranged
in 1961 to the current national television package, the equally shared
proceeds generated by the NFL's television broadcasting rights have
always been the single largest contributor to the League's revenue
sharing system. 10 3 Furthermore, the League's television revenue has
grown exponentially over the years, starting at $4.6 million for the
two year contract signed in 1961, and climbing all the way to $17.6
billion for the recent eight year package that expired after the 2005
season. 10 4 This tremendous growth in the NFL's equally shared
television revenue represents a self perpetuating indication of the
League's success as a whole. The competitive parity resulting from the
League's revenue sharing system in general has unquestionably
bolstered the success and popularity of the NFL by ensuring that in
any given year almost every team has a chance to make the
playoffs. 0 5 As a result of the League's immense popularity, television
networks have been willing to pay endlessly increasing sums of money
to secure NFL broadcasting rights, which in turn has ensured the
sustainability of the League's revenue sharing system, and thereby
the continued success of the League as a whole.

101.
See discussion infra Part III.B for a detailed analysis of the NFL's current
economic inequality.
102.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R1.
103.
Farmer, supra note 45, at Di; Miller, Revenue-Sharing Rates, supra note 11, at
C3; Mullick, supra note 1, at 12.
104.
Jarrett Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at C1.
105.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R1.
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The equal sharing of television revenue has become a symbol of
the League's unparalleled success, and its commitment to the "League
Think" philosophy. Under the NFL's current television package, the
League will get more revenue in one year than Major League Baseball
will get in six.106 In contrast to the extreme financial and competitive
inequalities that have plagued other professional sports leagues like
Major League Baseball, the NFL's ability to maintain its unmatched
popularity has largely been the result of the League's commitment to
revenue sharing. 10 7 The recent emergence of new sources of unshared
revenue, on the other hand, which fall within the definition of
Excluded DGR, have completely transformed the financial realities of
the League by enabling individual franchises to gain a competitive
108
advantage through the exploitation of unshared revenue.
Furthermore, the drastic increase of these sources of unshared
revenue has led to extreme levels of financial inequality throughout
the League, which now threaten the continued viability of the NFL's
current economic system.
III. THIRD AND LONG: THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF "LOCAL
REVENUE" AND THE DESPERATE NEED FOR REVENUE SHARING
REFORMS
A. Unshared "Local Revenue" and the Erosion of the NFL's Collective
Mentality

The advent of these unshared revenue sources enumerated in
Excluded DGR has not only drastically altered the landscape of the
revenue sharing system in the NFL, but has also revolutionized the
business model followed by team owners throughout the League. 0 9
Abandoning the old passive business model where owners promoted
equality and were content to rely on revenue sharing as their primary
source of income, teams have increasingly sought to maximize their
competitive advantage by exploiting as many sources of unshared
revenue as possible. Art Model, who joined the League in 1961 as the
majority owner of the Cleveland Browns and left this past April after
selling his share of the Baltimore Ravens, articulated this change in
the League's mentality when he said, "The values have changed. We

106.

Id. at R2.

107.
108.
109.

Mullick, supra note 1, at 12.
See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R1-R2.
See Mullick, supra note 1, at 14-18.
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were comrades in arms. We were partners. That doesn't happen now.
Everything is revenues and profits."'110
With the growing emphasis on profits, teams have increasingly
turned to Excluded DGR, which contains the following list of unshared
revenue sources: "revenues derived from concessions, parking, local
advertising and promotion, signage, magazine advertising, local
sponsorship agreements, stadium clubs, luxury box income other than
that included in subsection 1(a)(i)(1)."'11 1 Aptly labeled "local revenue,"
these unshared revenue sources have been harnessed by expedient
owners to supplement their income, and they have had a profound
impact on multiple facets of the NFL with mixed results for the
League as a whole. While the incentives created by these sources of
unshared revenue have helped the League grow by promoting the
construction of new stadiums, the drastically increasing nature of
local revenue, which is generally more easily utilized by larger market
teams, has led to a widening revenue gap between the League's rich
11 2
and poor teams.
Following the lead of business-driven owners like Jerry Jones,
owners throughout the league have recognized that most of the major
sources of local revenue stem directly from the ability of individual
3
franchises to gain control over the stadiums in which they play."
With owners drooling over the unshared revenue streams generated
by controlling stadium parking, concessions, signage, and luxury box
income, the League has experienced a significant trend with regard to
4
the construction of new stadiums and the renovation of old ones."
Since 1995, sixteen new NFL stadiums have opened throughout the
1 5
League, and a seventeenth is due to open by the 2006 season.
Furthermore, the League has contributed $650 million to eight

110.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R2.
111.
CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, § 1(a)(iii). The language "other than that
included in subsection 1(a)(i)(1)" is referring to "ticket revenue from 'luxury boxes' .
subject to gate receipt sharing." Id.
112.
See discussion infra Part III.B explaining that unshared local revenue has been
a major cause of the widening revenue gap.
113.
See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R6-7; Mullick, supra note
1, at 14-18.
114.
See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R4; Mullick, supra note 1,
at 14-18. See discussion infra Part III.C describing the League's efforts to facilitate the
construction of new stadiums.
115.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R4. The new stadium set to
open by the 2006 season is being constructed in Mesa for the Arizona Cardinals.
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stadium projects that are being funded by a combination of public and
116
private sources.
In their relentless pursuit of local revenue, profit-hungry
owners have discovered creative ways to not only help finance stadium
projects, but to make the completed stadiums even more lucrative
with regard to unshared local revenue. It is in this context that the
distinction between luxury box "ticket revenue" and non-ticket
revenue becomes extremely significant. Luxury boxes, which provide
first class amenities like catering and a private bar, are usually leased
to a corporate customer for extended periods of time (usually at least
an entire season), typically giving the lessee access to the luxury box
for all stadium events including those performances unrelated to the
117
NFL, such as rock concerts or other professional sporting events.
Therefore, any franchise that owns its own stadium can keep most of
the substantial revenue generated by these expensive luxury box lease
arrangements.' 18 Conversely, teams that have unfavorable leases with
a municipality or other entity that owns the stadium are at a
competitive disadvantage because they are missing out on enormous
streams of unshared revenue. 11 9
The importance of luxury box revenue is illustrated by the
desire of the New York Giants to build a new $700 million stadium
next to its current twenty-nine year old venue. 120 In addition to
sharing their stadium with their cross-town rivals, the New York Jets,
the Giants do not own their stadium, and therefore are forced to split
the luxury box revenue three ways. 1 21 However, were the Giants to
build their own stadium they would not have to share that revenue
with anyone, giving them at least two-thirds more than they currently
receive. Back in 1995, when the boom in new stadiums was reaching

116.
Id. See discussion infra Part III.C concerning the League's plan to help
facilitate the construction of new stadiums under what has become known as the NFL's G3 Program.
117.
See Gavin Power, Luxury Boxes Do Score Big, S.F. CHRONICLE, June 24, 1995,
at D1.
118.
See Mullick, supranote 1, at 16-17.
119.
See Giants Want A Stadium That Says 'Amenities,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, §
8, at 1 [hereinafter Amenities, N.Y. TIMES].
120.
Id. Explaining that the Giants need to keep up with Dallas, Washington, and
Philadelphia, all of which own their own stadiums, John Mara, the executive vice president
of the Giants said, "The three teams in our division are all in the top quartile." Id. Blaming
their unfavorable lease for the Giants' competitive disadvantage, Mara stressed the
importance of luxury box revenue explaining, "Right now we have 112 boxes, but we have a
three-way split with the Jets and the sports authority. We would contemplate having 200
boxes." Id. On April 14, 2005, the Giants signed an agreement with the state of New
Jersey to build their new stadium. Kaplan, Pro FootballLoses, supra note 23, at 4.
121.
See Amenities, N.Y. TIMES, supra note 119, at 1.
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its height, Leigh Steinberg, a sports attorney, speculated that a
popular NFL team playing in a stadium with 150 luxury boxes could
easily earn an additional twelve million dollars per year from luxury
box income alone. 12 2 This figure has undoubtedly increased
dramatically over the last ten years as luxury boxes have become more
and more opulent, commanding higher prices.
Not surprisingly, the New York Jets had a new stadium
proposal of their own to build a $1.4 billion stadium on the lower west
side of Manhattan. 123 Their proposal illustrates how luxury box
income can serve as an important source of funding to finance the
construction of new stadiums. The Jets promised that if their new
stadium was built, there would be no increase in regular ticket prices
during the stadium's first season because they knew that they could
rely on luxury box income to offset the need for any hike in ticket
prices that might otherwise be necessary to help fund the construction
of their new stadium. 124 Therefore, unshared luxury box revenue has
not only become an integral element in the financial success of an
individual franchise, but also serves as an important way for NFL
teams to partially finance their new stadiums.
Jerry Jones is quick to proffer his view that these stadiumrelated sources of unshared revenue are good for the League.
Stressing his incentive based arguments, Jones explained, "If you
don't have some unshared revenues, those stadiums never get built
because of all the debt. You think people are going to build those
stadiums if they were sharing the revenue 32 ways? No. Why did they
get built? Because of the incentive."'125 While it is hard to argue that
unshared local revenue has not had some positive effects on the
current state of the NFL, it is important to weigh the positives and
negatives associated with unshared revenue in determining what is
best for the future of the League. There is no doubt that in today's
economy there is a need for some unshared revenue in order to provide
incentives for teams to market themselves and to help generate
beneficial externalities like stadium construction. Too much unshared
revenue, on the other hand, is detrimental to the League because it
will inevitably lead to a widening gap between revenue-rich teams

122.
Mullick, supra note 1, at 4-5; Power, supra note 117, at D1.
123.
Steven Zeitchik, The Jets and Steelers: A Tale of Two Stadium Plans and Their
Cities, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 3, 2005, at 3. Since the first draft of this paper was completed, the
Jets' stadium proposal, which was also part of New York City's bid to host the 2012
Summer Olympics, was rejected by the State of New York, which denied the public funding
needed for the stadium's construction.
124.
Id.
125.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 2-3C.
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with favorable stadium situations and revenue-poor teams with
unfavorable stadium situations.
1. "Local Revenue" as the Cause of "Franchise Free Agency"
At first glance, all this additional revenue and all these new
stadiums might appear to be nothing but a good thing for the League,
but upon closer inspection it becomes clear that there are some
significant concerns lurking just behind the glare of the bright new
stadium lights. The incessant quest for unshared revenue by NFL
owners has been largely responsible for a phenomenon known as
"Franchise Free Agency."'126 This phenomenon, which is characterized
by the recent relocation of numerous franchises seeking more lucrative
stadiums in which to play, has not only drawn the attention of
significant scholarly analysis, but has also prompted Congress to
propose numerous bills attempting to prevent franchises from
arbitrarily abandoning their home city simply to secure a more
127
profitable venue.
This string of proposed bills was largely the result of lobbying
on the part of the NFL in response to two Ninth Circuit decisions in
the 1980s involving the relocation of the Raiders franchise from
Oakland to Los Angeles. 128 In the first decision, the court held that
the NFL violated the Sherman Antitrust Act when the NFL owners
unanimously voted against approving the relocation.' 29 At that time,
any team relocation required a three-quarters majority approval by

team owners, as provided for in Article 4.3 of the NFL Constitution. 130
Despite recognizing that territorial allocations were necessary for the
viability of the NFL, the court concluded that the restraints necessary
for the NFL to survive could have been achieved through a less
restrictive rule.' 3' The court explained that there might be a
reasonable basis for preventing a team's relocation if the League
properly considered "objective factors.., such as population, economic
projections, facilities, regional balance . . . [flan loyalty and location

126.
See Mullick, supra note 1.
127.
Don Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark
Law as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1078-79 (2004).
128. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL (RaidersI1), 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986);
L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL (Raiders 1), 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984);
Nottingham, supra note 127, at 1075-76.
129.
Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1401; Nottingham, supra note 127, at 1075-76.
130.
Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1401; NFL CONST. art. 4.3; Nottingham, supra note 127,
at 1075-76.
131.
Nottingham, supra note 127, at 1075.
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continuity."132 In the second suit, the court awarded treble damages to
the Raiders and to the Los Angeles Coliseum, which was the proposed
venue for the Raiders' relocation, based on the projected disparity in
133
the team's profits and the Coliseum's loss of lease income.
The combination of these two Ninth Circuit decisions has
proved to be a serious deterrent to the League in its decisions whether
to oppose subsequent franchise relocations because of the League's
fear of costly antitrust litigation and the possible liability that would
result from any decision rendered against the NFL. 134 As a result, the
League has turned to Congress in an attempt to gain an antitrust
exemption. Since 1985, Congress has considered seven different bills
that have taken various forms in their common attempts to protect
fans and communities from losing their home teams, but none of these
1 35
bills have passed.
Some of these bills support an antitrust exemption that would
enable the NFL to veto any proposed franchise relocation without any
threat of antitrust litigation, while others rely on the dictum in the
first Ninth Circuit decision that suggested the NFL could avoid future
antitrust liability by using objective guidelines when considering the
approval of a franchise relocation. 136 Despite Congress' inability to
enact any of these bills into law, the prevalence of the proposed
legislation indicates that "Franchise Free Agency" is a legitimate
concern for the nation as a whole. Furthermore, the large scale of this
political response is undoubtedly driven by significant unrest among
NFL fans, which poses a direct threat to the future popularity and
success of the League.
In addition to the negative reaction that franchise relocation
has on the NFL's fan base, the lure of unshared local revenue
generated by favorable stadium deals has eroded the NFL's "League
Think" philosophy, and, in certain circumstances, has hurt the League
as a whole. The relocation of the Rams from Los Angeles to St. Louis
serves as a perfect example of the detrimental effect that an
1 37
individual team's pursuit of local revenue can have on the League.
The advent of unshared local revenue has created a situation where
an individual owner's best interests are no longer necessarily aligned
with the best interests of the League. In the case of the Rams, the
franchise moved from the much larger market of Los Angeles to the
132.

Id. at 1076-77 (quoting Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1397).

133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1076.
See id.
Id. at 1077-79.

136.

Id.

137.

See id. at 1070.
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much smaller market of St. Louis mainly because St. Louis offered a
better stadium situation that would generate more unshared local
revenue for the team. 138 While the team itself benefited from the
move, the League as a whole suffered because St. Louis's smaller
market means that fewer people watch the Rams on television, and
this reduced audience thereby generates smaller television ratings
when compared to the ratings that could have been achieved had the
13 9
Rams remained in Los Angeles.
Since the Rams only absorbed a small portion of that decrease
due to the revenue sharing system, the increase in local revenue made
the move worthwhile for the team, but the aggregate effect for the rest
of the owners made the move more costly for the League as a whole. 140
Consequently, the emergence of local revenue has indirectly prevented
the League from capitalizing on the Los Angeles area fan base and the
enormous revenue opportunities presented by the nation's second
largest market. As a result, the League cannot maximize its evenly
shared television revenues, which thereby hurts the revenue sharing
141
system, and more importantly the League as a whole.
B. The Widening Revenue Gap and the Salary Cap System
The most detrimental consequence resulting from the
emergence of unshared local revenue has been the widening gap
between the League's revenue-rich teams and its less prosperous
counterparts. 142 While the teams at the top like the Washington
Redskins and the New England Patriots can generate upwards of $250
million in annual revenue, teams at the bottom like the Arizona
Cardinals and Indianapolis Colts struggle to produce just over half the
annual revenue enjoyed by their wealthier brethren. 143 Furthermore,
this revenue gap is about twelve times what it was in 1990, 144 and the
increasing nature of these revenue disparities illustrates a disturbing

138.

Id.

139.

Id.

140.
Id.
141.
From speaking with Steve Underwood, the Executive Vice President, General
Counsel and Executive Assistant to the Owner of the Tennessee Titans, the author has
gained first hand knowledge of the significance that NFL insiders place on the current
financial void left by the League's inability to place a franchise in the nation's second
largest market, Los Angeles.
142.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R2.
143.
Bell, NFL Thg-of-War, supra note 14, at IC; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?,
supra note 4, at R2.
144.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R2.
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trend that must be addressed by the League before it inflicts
permanent damage on the popularity of NFL.
The major source of this widening revenue gap, much like
"Franchise Free Agency," is the increasing need for owners to secure
beneficial stadium deals in order to capitalize on unshared local
revenue. 145 As in the case of the New York Giants, teams that are
stuck in unfavorable stadium arrangements cannot take advantage of
local revenue, and therefore experience a significant competitive
disadvantage. 146 This point is illustrated by the situation of the
Indianapolis Colts, who according to a Forbes report published in
2003, ranked twenty-ninth in franchise value ($547 million) the
previous year, while leasing the NFL's smallest stadium (the RCA
147
Dome with 56,127 seat capacity) in the twenty-fifth largest market.
Furthermore, the Indianapolis market lacks the number of corporate
supporters that enable other franchises to flourish through the use of
premium seating and luxury boxes, both of which are important
148
sources of unshared local revenue.
Conversely, the NFL's most valuable franchise, the
Washington Redskins, was valued by the Forbes report at an
astounding $952 million in 2002.149 Along with Jerry Jones, Redskins
owner Daniel Snyder is one of the largest proponents of increasing
unshared revenues in order to encourage teams to capitalize on savvy
management techniques that are more readily available in a less
restricted market. 150 Under Snyder's leadership, the Redskins, who
own their own stadium and play in the NFL's largest venue (FedEx
Field with 86,484 seat capacity), have utilized a vast array of local
revenue sources to become the first NFL team to surpass $200 million
in annual revenue.1 5 1 In addition to their exploitation of the more
obvious sources of local revenue like luxury box sales, concessions, and
parking, the Redskins have also capitalized on their marketability,
which not only enabled Snyder to negotiate a thirty year, $205 million
stadium naming-rights deal, but has also facilitated the creation of a
dozen "Redskins Store" outlets, which also generate significant
unshared revenue. 152 By comparing the enormous local revenue

145.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 1C
146.
Id. at 3C. For a detailed discussion of the Giants stadium situation see supra
text accompanying notes 120-121.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R4-R6.
151.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 3C.
152.
Id.
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opportunities of a larger market team like the Redskins, who own
their own stadium, and the limited local revenue possibilities for a
smaller market team like the Colts, who do not control their stadium,
the source of the NFL's current revenue gap becomes readily
apparent.
Although the increasing economic inequalities in the NFL seem
relatively clear, it is also important to recognize some of the
arguments against revenue sharing made by those owners who have
financed some or all of their stadium acquisitions through private
debt. These owners argue that one must think in terms of net profits,
not total annual revenue, because the large amount of debt incurred to
153
buy the stadium initially negates much of the apparent advantage.
For example, the Philadelphia Eagles, who in 2003 moved into a new
$512 million stadium, must allocate more than thirty million dollars a
year to service their debt. 154 This argument criticizing too much
revenue sharing is adeptly characterized by a statement attributed to
Daniel Snyder of the Redskins. Snyder reportedly said, "I'll share my
revenue whenever they're ready to share my debt."1 55 Owners like
Snyder, who has roughly $300 million in debt left from his $800
million acquisition of the Redskins and their stadium in 1999, argue
that since they were the ones who put up the initial capital, they are
56
entitled to reap the benefits of stadium ownership.'
While there is undoubtedly some merit to these arguments, it
is important to note that in the context of acquiring a large market
NFL stadium or franchise, there is little in the way of the risk that
would normally be associated with a leveraged investment, largely
because of the current economic state of the League as a whole. In
2003, every single franchise experienced a net profit; furthermore, the
revenue of the League as a whole has increased by a factor of greater
than five over the past fifteen years. 57 The strength of the League's
current economic outlook is illustrated by the fact that traffic on the
NFL's Internet site surpasses that of other pro leagues, its television
broadcasts outpace prime-time averages, and its especially devoted
58
fans buy more than ninety percent of available tickets.'
Furthermore, the League generated somewhere around $5.5 billion in

153.
supra note
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R6; Bell, NFL Tug-of-War,
14, at 4C.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R6.
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Id.
Id. at R1-R3.
Id. at R3.

PERFECTINGTHE BALANCE

2006]

total revenue last year, which is the most income produced by any of
159
the four major U.S. professional sports leagues.
When one considers these astounding statistics in relation to
the structural reality of the League, it is impossible to ignore that the
value of an individual franchise is completely dependent on the
success of the League as a whole because without the League, each
individual franchise would be worthless. Although the owners who
financed their own stadiums would argue that they deserve greater
returns because they bore the risk of their leveraged investment, this
argument is largely mitigated by considering the minimal amount of
risk actually incurred. Therefore, since an individual owner does not
bear much financial risk when his franchise leverages its investment
in stadium infrastructure, asking the more profitable teams to share a
small portion of local revenue with their less prosperous counterparts
is not an unreasonable request, especially because the value of an
individual franchise is necessarily tied to the success of the League as
a whole.
1. The Failure of the Salary Cap System and the Resulting
Competitive Inequalities on the Field
While the competitive advantage gained through stadium
ownership serves as the largest catalyst for the widening revenue gap,
the economic disparities that exist between the individual teams also
adversely affect the ability of lower-revenue teams to remain
competitive on the field. Significantly, the revenue-strapped Colts paid
more than seventy percent of their revenues to player salaries in 2003,
160
whereas richer teams spent only thirty-eight percent on salaries.
The discrepancy in the percentage of income that a given team can
spend on player salaries has a huge impact on the ability of lowerrevenue teams to compete with higher revenue teams in the highpriced free agent market. 161 As Colts President Bill Polian explains,
"We can't keep as many people as some teams can .... The issue is
cash. If you have cash that your stadium is generating every year, you
can commit that to bonuses to retain or get players in the free agent
162
market. That's the name of the game."
Despite the League's adoption of a salary cap, which was
meant to help level the playing field, the statistics seem to support
159.
160.
161.
supra note
162.

Id. at R1. The four major leagues are baseball, basketball, football, and hockey.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 1.
See Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R5; Bell, NFL Tug-of-War,
14, at 1C-2C.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 1C-2C.
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Polian's claim that lower-revenue teams cannot compete with higher
revenue teams in the free agent market. According to data supplied by
the players union, the Redskins committed more than seventy-seven
million dollars in signing bonuses between the 2003 and 2004 seasons,
whereas the Arizona Cardinals spent only twenty-two million dollars
during that same period. 163 Owners critical of too much revenue
sharing have been quick to point out that those teams in a superior
financial position have not necessarily experienced a competitive
advantage on the field, as evidenced by the fact that teams like the
164
Cowboys have not made the playoffs for a number of years.
Notwithstanding the inability of the Cowboys to "buy" their success, it
would be completely ridiculous to argue with the statement made by
Atlanta Falcons owner Arthur Blank, that "[a]t some point there is a
correlation between what you're paying your players and your ability
65
to compete."'
In order to fully understand the competitive inequalities that
exist in the free agent market, it is important to explain how the
salary cap works, and how revenue rich teams can take advantage of a
system that ironically was intended to help the lower-revenue teams
remain competitive. The salary cap, which sets both a floor and a
ceiling on what a team can (or must) spend on player salaries in a
given year, is calculated as a percentage of DGR. 166 Therefore, as the
League's revenues have steadily increased, fueled largely by the
construction of new stadiums, so too has the salary cap. 167 Last year's
salary cap was set at $80.6 million with a $67.3 million floor, which is
a significant increase from the $34.6 million cap set in 1994, the year
of its inception. 168 Instead of helping lower-revenue teams remain
competitive, this dramatic increase in the salary cap has actually hurt
the lower-revenue teams stuck in unfavorable stadium situations
163.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R5.
164.
Id. at R6.
165.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra 14, at 4C.
166.
See CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, §§ 2-4; Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra 14, at
5C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R5. The salary cap system, which has
been widely credited with maintaining the competitive parity within the NFL, is not
usually considered to be part and parcel with the League's greater revenue sharing system,
and instead is normally regarded as a separate and distinct financial model. The salary cap
system, however, is also responsible for governing how League revenue is shared with
players, and therefore should also be considered part of the NFL's greater revenue sharing
system. See discussion infra Part III.D explaining how revenue sharing and the salary cap
are interrelated.
167.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra 14, at 5C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra
note 4, at R5.
168.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra 14, at 5C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra
note 4, at R5.
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because their revenue has not increased proportionally.' 69 Therefore,
these lower-revenue teams have been unable to keep pace with their
wealthier counterparts, who have experienced a significant
competitive advantage through the use of unshared local revenue.
Further exacerbating the inequalities that exist under the
salary cap are the loopholes in the system that allow teams to
amortize the cost of signing bonuses over the life of the contract, which
basically means that for accounting purposes, a team can spread out
how much the bonus counts against the cap for each individual year of
the contract.170 Under this system, teams can spend well above the cap
by giving free agents larger signing bonuses and smaller annual
salaries. 17 1 Therefore, teams with more local revenue are in a position
to spend much more on signing bonuses, which in turn gives them a
significant advantage in attracting talented free agents. 172 As
mentioned above, this system allowed the Redskins to offer seventyseven million dollars in signing bonuses during the same period in
which the Cardinals could only offer twenty-two million dollars.1 73 The
glaring nature of this loophole is further illustrated by the comments
of Michael Duberstein, a research director with the NFLPA, who
indicated that teams have been able to spend two billion dollars above
1 74
the cap over the past decade by amortizing costs.
C. The NFL's CurrentReaction to the ProblemsPosed by "Local
Revenue" and the Widening Revenue Gap
The widening revenue gap created by both the emergence of
local revenue and the salary cap system has sparked considerable
debate amongst the NFL owners. The owners of lower-revenue teams
like the Colts and Cardinals have expressed their belief that under the
League's current economic model these less prosperous teams cannot
compete with their revenue-rich counterparts who are better equipped
to capitalize on the local revenue opportunities created by stadium

169.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra 14, at 5C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra
note 4, at R5.
170.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R5.
171.
See id.
172.
Id. Signing bonuses are also attractive to potential free agents because the
money is guaranteed, whereas the annual salary offered by a player-contract is not
guaranteed to the player, and the team can decide to release that player without being
responsible for the remaining value of the contract.
173.
Fatsis Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R5; see supra text
accompanying note 163.
174.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R5.
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ownership. 175 According to lower-revenue teams, the revenue gap is
reaching such a critical level that their future economic viability will
soon be in serious doubt, and therefore the League must find a way to
better redistribute some of the local revenue that has created this
76
economic discrepancy. 1
Conversely, the owners of high-revenue teams like the
Redskins and Cowboys argue that if teams are forced to include their
local revenue in the total amount of revenue shared by the League, it
will eliminate any incentive for less prosperous teams to market
themselves. 177 As Cowboys owner Jerry Jones explains, "The big
concern I have is not how to equalize the disparity in revenue[,] but
how to get the clubs that are not generating the revenue to see the
1 78
light."
There is some merit to Jones's argument since poor
management decisions by lower-revenue teams might be partially to
blame for their inferior economic position. However, in deciding
whether to reform the current revenue sharing system, the NFL must
also consider some of the economic factors that are beyond the control
of the lower-revenue owners, such as stadium ownership and market
size. Since a team's potential marketability is directly tied to the size
of its local market, teams like the Cowboys and Redskins can take
advantage of their larger markets to increase their unshared local
revenue through both local sponsorship deals and local stadium
revenue. 79 At the same time, playing in a large market does not
necessarily guarantee that a team will be able to capitalize on sources
of local revenue, because that team might be stuck in an unfavorable
stadium situation, as illustrated by the experience of the New York
Giants. 8 0 Therefore, when evaluating the need for revenue sharing
reforms, the NFL should not only consider the inherent economic
disparities that exist between small and large market teams; it must
also factor in the realities surrounding every team's ability to secure a
beneficial stadium deal.
The NFL has taken a variety of steps to help address some of
the problems that have been created by the emergence of local revenue
and the resulting increase in the revenue gap. Some of these League
175.
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
176.
See Miller, Revenue-Sharing Rates, supra note 11, at C2. As Colts owner, Jim
Irsay argued, 'There are many teams that realize they cannot go forward like this. It's
become that big of an issue." Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R2-R3.
177.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R6.
178.
Id.
179.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
180.
See supra text accompanying notes 121-122.
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initiatives are specifically designed to combat the increasing economic
inequalities within the NFL, while others focus more on addressing
some of the indirect effects of local revenue, such as "Franchise Free
Agency." In order to facilitate the construction of new stadiums, the
League adopted a program set forth in Resolution G-3 of 1999 ("G-3
Program"), which has loaned $650 million in League money to help
eight different stadium projects, all of which were funded by a
combination of public and private financing.1 8 ' This G-3 Program is
meant to promote stadium construction, which could potentially
benefit lower-revenue teams by enabling them to build new stadiums
and thereby better capitalize on local revenue. Although the program
does seek to eliminate some of the local revenue-related incentives
that contributed to the emergence of "Franchise Free Agency," this
program may actually reduce the overall amount of shared revenue,
and is therefore not well suited to address the overarching problems
created by the widening revenue gap.
In order to qualify for G-3 financial assistance from the League,
a stadium project must be financed by public-private funding, and the
amount that the League will contribute is directly tied to the amount
of the individual franchise's private contribution ("Private
Contribution") to its own stadium project. 8 2 The allocation of League
funds to the financing of a G-3 stadium is technically in the form of a
loan, but it is repaid directly out of the visiting team's share ("VTS") of
the luxury box and club seat revenue. 8 3 Similarly, in the context of a
non-G-3 stadium, luxury box and club seat revenue can also be
exempted from VTS, provided it is used for the direct financing of the
non-G-3 stadium's construction. 8 4 However, notwithstanding this
similar treatment of certain luxury box revenues, there are additional
benefits that accrue to those owners who qualify for the G-3 Program.
In particular, the G-3 Program should reduce a team's cost of capital
by eliminating some of the transaction costs that would otherwise be
181.
NFL, NFL RES. G-3 (1999) [hereinafter NFL RES. G-3]; Fatsis, Can Socialism
Survive?, supra note 4, at R4; Glenn Dickey, Mayor Sets Stadium Deadline, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Oct. 24, 2004, at C1. The original G-3 plan established in RES. G-3 was set to
expire after the 2002 NFL season, but the League extended and reaffirmed the G-3
Program in NFL RES. JC-1 (2003) retaining all of the original principle parameters set
forth in RES. G-3.

182.
NFL RES. G-3, supra note 181; NFL RES. JC-1 (1) (2003) [hereinafter NFL RES.
JC-1] (stating "the League shall make a loan to the affected Club to support such project
based on the amount that the affected Club has committed to such project as a private
contribution (the 'Private Contribution')").
183.
NFL RES. G-3, supra note 181; NFL RES. JC-1, supra note 182; Dickey, supra
note 181, at C1.
184.
NFL RES. G-3, supra note 181; NFL RES. JC-1, supra note 182; Dickey, supra
note 181, at C1.
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required to secure financing from a private institution. Therefore,
under the G-3 Program, the League is in essence simply making
private loans easier for the individual owners to obtain by exempting
ticket revenue that would otherwise be shared with the visiting club,
and instead using that revenue to pay off the loan. This arrangement
promotes stadium construction because owners can partially finance
the building of their new stadium with revenue that they otherwise
would have been forced to share with the visiting teams had they
18 5
remained in their old stadium.
One of the principle intentions of the NFL's G-3 Program is to
encourage large market teams to stay in their home city (instead of
moving to a smaller market) by offering favorable loans that help the
teams finance their public-private stadium projects. 8 6 This is implied
by the language establishing the precise amounts that the League will
loan to a participating franchise under the G-3 Program. The exact
provision is enumerated in the subsequent Resolution JC-1 adopted in
2003, which extended the life of the G-3 Program, and provides in
part:
That the amount of such League loan shall be either 34% or 50% of the Private
Contribution, determined by the size of the television market in which the stadium
involved is being constructed, with League loans at the 50% level to be made
available to facilitate stadium construction projects for NFL clubs currently
operating in the six largest national television markets, and with the League loans
in all other television markets limited to 34% of the Private Contribution. 187

While the G-3 Program helps both small and large market
teams finance public-private stadium construction, the program favors
large market teams by providing them with much larger loans. This
favorable treatment given to the largest market teams is meant to
provide incentives for those teams to remain in their home cities,
which benefits the entire NFL by enabling the League to capitalize on
the increased television revenue generated by these larger markets.
The G-3 Program undoubtedly provides universal benefits that
help all franchises looking to utilize public-private financing in the
construction of a new stadium. Furthermore, by encouraging teams to
remain in the largest markets, this program should help to increase
the League's television revenue, which is shared equally, and
therefore should benefit the League as a whole. However, an increase

185.
This arrangement provides the incentives for stadium construction at the
expense of the revenue sharing system by funneling revenue away from the sharing
system, and into the pockets of individual clubs.
186.
NFL RES. G-3, supra note 181; NFL RES. JC-1, supra note 182; Dickey, supra
note 181, at Cl.
187.
NFL RES. JC-1, supra note 182 (emphasis added).
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in equally shared television revenue confers the same benefit upon
every team notwithstanding their relative financial positions. This
program therefore does not help to alleviate any of the inherent
economic inequalities that exist in smaller market cities. In fact, this
program might actually exacerbate the economic disparities that
currently exist in the League today by helping large market teams
better capitalize on local revenue at the expense of smaller market
teams who, under this program, do not enjoy the same level of League
subsidies. Instead of redistributing some of the advantages enjoyed by
large market teams that can more easily utilize their marketability to
generate more local revenue, the G-3 Program actually has the effect
of giving the large market teams an additional leg up on their smaller
market counterparts.
In addition to the G-3 Program, the NFL has also created a
"supplemental" revenue sharing pool, which would appear far better
suited to combat the widening revenue gap that threatens the
League's current competitive balance. The so-called "supplemental"
revenue sharing pool, created under the salary cap system,
redistributes roughly forty million dollars a year in local revenue to a
small number of lower-revenue teams.18 8 Typically, each year six to
nine teams draw from the "supplemental" pool, which has grown from
eighteen million dollars to its current mark of forty million dollars.1 8 9
Despite its potential to help alleviate the League's widening revenue
gap, the "supplemental" revenue sharing pool has proven insufficient
to keep pace with the dramatically increasing nature of the economic
disparities in the NFL. 190 For example, $8.5 million is the most that
any team has drawn from the pool in a single year. 191 Moreover, when
this figure is considered in relation to the gap in annual revenue
between the NFL's richest and poorest teams, which has well exceeded
the $100 million mark, the "supplemental" pool's inadequacy in
dealing with the exponentially increasing economic disparity becomes
192
apparent.
Notwithstanding the League's marginal attempts to counteract
the various harmful effects that stem from the recent growth in local

Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 4C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?,
188.
supra note 4, at R6; Miller, Revenue-Sharing Rates, supra note 11, at C2.
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revenue, these emerging unshared revenue streams no longer simply
threaten to bend the rules of the NFL's collective philosophy. Instead,
the revenue sharing system itself appears to be on the brink of a
complete fracture. In response to the current economic realities of the
League, Commissioner Tagliabue has appointed a twelve member
special committee to examine a wide array of financial concerns, with
one of the focuses being revenue discrepancies and the issue of
whether teams should share more of their local revenue. 193
Nevertheless, despite these clear indications that the current revenue
sharing system requires significant reform, when establishing the
special committee, Tagliabue claimed that revenue sharing is only one
of many topics, and that the bigger concern of the committee and that
of the League as a whole is extending the NFL's current CBA, which is
set to expire after the 2007 season, with the salary cap component
expiring after the 2006 season. 194 As further explored below, failing to
extend the current CBA could cause irreparable damage to the success
of the NFL, and therefore the on-going labor negotiations undoubtedly
deserve the League's undivided attention. The NFL, however, would
be well advised to simultaneously consider revenue sharing reforms
because any progress in reaching a labor agreement will necessarily
require the League to address the same central issue behind the
revenue sharing debate-namely, the manner in which local revenue
will be treated.
D. Labor Unrest: Why are Revenue SharingReforms so Crucialto the
Successful Extension of the Current CBA and its Salary Cap
System?95
Commissioner Tagliabue is completely warranted in his
concern about extending the CBA, but contrary to his opinion, the
issues surrounding the extension of the labor agreement cannot be
completely divorced from the debate over what to do about local
193.
Id.; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R6.
194.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 2C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?,
supra note 4, at R6. See discussion infra Part III.D.1 for an analysis of the recent
developments in the on-going CBA negotiations and the resulting implications for the
League.
195.
Portions of the analysis in this section may have been rendered somewhat moot
by the last-minute extension of the CBA, and the corresponding revenue sharing reforms.
Nevertheless, the overall analysis remains extremely significant because it sets the stage
under which the new deal was struck. In particular, it establishes how the hostile
negotiations created leverage for the NFLPA, and ultimately forced the owners to concede
to the demands of the union instead of facing the daunting possibility of moving forward
without a new labor deal or salary cap in place.
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revenue. 196 Gene Upshaw, executive director of the NFLPA, has
indicated that there is a slight distinction between the debate among
owners over how revenue should be shared between teams and the
issues presented by the CBA negotiations regarding how overall
League revenue should be shared with players. 197 In particular,
Upshaw remarked, "I don't care if their revenues are shared or
unshared... I just want our share."198 While the labor union does not
appear to be concerned with the resulting inequality in the
competitive balance of the League, the NFLPA is very concerned with
the dramatically increasing nature of unshared local revenue. 199
Under the current CBA's salary cap system, each year players
are guaranteed around sixty-five percent of the League's total DGR,
but since local revenue is part of Excluded DGR, it is outside the reach
of the salary cap system. 200 The players argue that they deserve some
of the exponentially increasing local revenue currently shielded from
their reach by the Excluded DGR provision, and Gene Upshaw has
made it clear that the NFLPA will not agree to an extension of the
current CBA with its definition of DGR still intact. 20' Furthermore, in
describing the revenue sharing model that is currently in place under
the CBA, Upshaw explained, "[w]e've outgrown that model to a model
that to us looks like it should [include] all revenue. ' 20 2 Thus, the
sharing of local revenue is in fact a labor issue, and because the CBA
expires in two years, the issue must be addressed soon, otherwise the
NFL could experience a work stoppage that would unquestionably
damage the profitability of the League and that of each individual
203
franchise.
196.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 4C.
197.
See id., at 5C; Kaplan, NFL Impasse, supra note 15, at 1; Mullen & Kaplan,
NFL Sides Agree, supra note 15, at 3.
198.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 5C.
199.
Id.; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R7. In the recent
negotiations that ultimately produced a new last-minute CBA and revenue sharing plan
just before this note went to print, the NFLPA took a much more proactive role in forcing
the owners to address the issue of revenue sharing between teams. See Kaplan, Chaos and
Compromise, supra note 17, at 1. In particular, the union was concerned that the widening
revenue gap could inflict such damage on the overall League that the players might lose
out on revenues under any new labor agreement that did not include revenue sharing
reforms. Id. The NFLPA actually conditioned its final offer for a new labor deal on the
owners' ability to approve adequate revenue sharing reforms. Id.
200.
CBA, supra note 11, art. XXIV, §§ 1-6; Bell NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at
2C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R7.
201.
Bell, NFL Tug-of-War, supra note 14, at 5C; Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?,
supra note 4, at R7.
202.
Fatsis, Can Socialism Survive?, supra note 4, at R7 (emphasis added).
203.
As indicated by the recent developments and the current direction of the ongoing labor negotiations, the League could theoretically address the sharing of local
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1. The On-going Labor Negotiations: Recent Developments and Their
Implications for Revenue Sharing Reforms
The League and the players' union initially made some
progress in their negotiations to extend the current CBA, but as of fall
20 4
2005 the negotiations appeared to have reached a stalemate.
Significantly, at some point during the labor talks, the owners and the
players union tentatively agreed that local revenue will no longer be
excluded from the revenue that is shared with players. 20 5 Instead,
both parties have agreed that any new labor agreement will guarantee
that the players receive a percentage of "total football revenue" as
opposed to a percentage of DGR. 20 6 If this agreement does in fact come
to fruition, players would be entitled to a portion of those previously
unshared revenue sources currently shielded from their reach by the
existing CBA's Excluded DGR provision. Despite this initial progress,
however, the future outlook of these on-going negotiations appears far
20 7
less promising.
After initial negotiations yielded a consensus on the sharing of
total football revenue with players, subsequent talks have hit a major
stumbling block that now threatens to preclude any possibility of
reaching a new labor pact before the current CBA expires. In
particular, both sides have been unable to agree upon the exact
percentage of total football revenue that should be reserved for the
players. While the union is currently asking for sixty-four percent of
total football revenue, the League has refused to relinquish more than
fifty-seven percent, and with total revenues estimated to reach $5.7
billion this year, these opposing positions correspond to a monetary
20 8
difference of nearly $400 million, or $12.5 million per team.
revenue with players, while at the same time leaving the sharing of local revenue between
owners an unanswered question. Such an approach would hopefully provide a quick fix for
one part of the League's twin-headed monster (revenue sharing reforms & CBA
negotiations), but, at the same time, would most likely open an entire new set of problems.
204.
See Kaplan, NFL Impasse, supra note 15, at 1; Daniel Kaplan, NFL Owners
Told How Signings Would Work With No New CBA, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS
JOURNAL, Nov. 21, 2005, at 34 [hereinafter Kaplan, NFL Owners Told]; Mullen & Kaplan,

NFL Sides Agree, supra note 15, at 3; Peter King, Let There Be Labor Peace: NFL on CBA,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 26, 2005, at 86.

205.
This tentative agreement to include local revenue only applies to the sharing of
revenue with players, and the question of how exactly local revenue will be treated for
purposes of revenue sharing between owners remains an unanswered.
206.
Kaplan, NFL Impasse, supra note 15, at 1.
207.
Id.; Daniel Kaplan & Liz Mullen, NFL Owners to Hear Same Old Story on
Stalled Labor Talks, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Nov. 14, 2005, at 4
[hereinafter Kaplan & Mullen, NFL Owners to Hear]; Mullen & Kaplan, NFL Sides Agree,
supra note 15, at 3.
208.
Kaplan, NFL Impasse, supra note 15, at 1.
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Furthermore, multiple NFL insiders have begun to express their
frustrations with the current standoff, and there is little optimism
that a deal will be completed before teams start making off-season
moves in anticipation of the 2006 season, which officially begins on
March 3, 2006.209
Despite a mounting sense of urgency, both sides have recently
confirmed their unwillingness to compromise, while at the same time
recognizing the need to reach an agreement before the March
deadline. 2 10 Specifically, the League attempted to break the stalemate
by offering a nominal increase over its original offer of fifty-seven
percent, but the NFLPA rejected the League's revised offer claiming it
was so inadequate that it did not deserve a counteroffer. 211 The
League has been similarly resistant to the idea of any significant
concessions to the players union, and has specifically refused to even
consider meeting the union halfway. 2 12 Therefore, despite recognizing
the importance of reaching an agreement in the near future, both
sides remain so sharply divided that it appears unlikely that they will
be capable of reaching an agreement before the salary cap expires on
the third day of March.
If the two parties are unable to reach a deal before March 3,
2006, which marks the start of the 2006 season and the upcoming
draft and free agency period, this failure will have an immediate
impact on the ability of teams to sign both their draft picks and
current free agents because teams will not be able to amortize signing
bonuses over the life of the contract for purposes of complying with the

209.
Mullen & Kaplan, NFL Sides Agree, supra note 15, at 3. The official start of the
2006 season and its corresponding free agency deadline was actually March 3, not March 1
as was reported in the above source. See Kaplan, NFL Owners to Set Revenue-Sharing
Plan, supra note 17, at 1; Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise, supra note 17, at 1; Mullen,
Winding Road, supra note 17, at 1. Furthermore, the owners and the NFLPA agreed to
extend the March 3 deadline just before its expiration, in hopes that the two sides could
reach a suitable compromise within a reasonable amount of time. Kaplan, NFL Owners to
Set Revenue-Sharing Plan, supra note 17, at 1; Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise, supra note
17, at 1; Mullen, Winding Road, supra note 17, at 1. When faced with the very real and
daunting possibility of realizing the various negative consequences outlined in the text
below, the owners ultimately conceded to the demands of the union by agreeing to
guarantee that under the new CBA, the players will receive the extra percentage points,
which had previously been so adamantly rejected by the owners. See Kaplan, NFL Owners
to Set Revenue-Sharing Plan, supra note 17, at 1; Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise, supra
note 17, at 1; Mullen, Winding Road, supra note 17, at 1.
210.
Mullen & Kaplan, NFL Sides Agree, supra note 15, at 3.
211.
Id. (stating that the exact amount of the League's revised offer was never
released).
212.
Kaplan & Mullen, NFL Owners to Hear, supra note 207, at 4; Daniel Kaplan &
Liz Mullen, Two Issues and Little Progressfor NFL, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS
JOURNAL, Oct. 3, 2005, at 4 [hereinafter Kaplan & Mullen, Two Issues].
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2006 salary cap. 213 Instead, teams will only be able to amortize
bonuses over the two remaining years of the current labor agreement
plus an additional two years, as provided for in the current CBA,
214
which would make the total amortization period only four years.
Such a shortened amortization period could wreak havoc for teams
trying to comply with the cap, especially because bonuses play such a
big role in signing draft picks and free agents. 21 5 This result could be
extremely detrimental to the popularity of the League because in
order to comply with the 2006 salary cap, teams might be forced to
either release their highly paid players or allow their draft picks to go
unsigned, and either option will lead to widespread unrest among
fans. Furthermore, Denver Broncos owner Pat Bowlen, who is one of
the League's lead negotiators, has expressed his concern that once the
salary cap expires on March 3, 2006, the entire salary cap system
216
could be lost forever.
Although both parties have apparently agreed to use total
football revenue in calculating the players' guaranteed share of
League income, recent press coverage of the on-going negotiations has
not specified how League revenue will be treated for the purposes of
revenue sharing between teams. In fact, the NFL and Commissioner
Tagliabue are apparently maintaining their previous position that
revenue sharing reforms can wait until after a new labor agreement
has been reached. 2 17 The NFLPA, however, has taken the opposite
position, and general counsel Richard Berthelsen, has emphasized

213.
Daniel Kaplan, On the Brink?, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL,
Jan. 30, 2006, at 19[hereinafter Kaplan, On the Brink?]; Mullen & Kaplan, NFL Sides
Agree, supra note 15, at 3.
214.
Mullen & Kaplan, NFL Sides Agree, supra note 15, at 3
215.
Id. (illustrating the increased difficulties that teams face in signing new players
while still complying with the shortened amortization period by citing an increase in length
of 36 pages for the contract signed by the first draft pick over the last two seasons).
216.
Id.; Kaplan, On the Brink?, supra note 213, at 19. In the few days that
immediately preceded the March 3 deadline, the owners were forced to recognize the true
extent of the free agency mess created by the shortened amortization period because the
immediacy of the deadline left them with no other choice but to start making cuts in order
to free-up cap room in anticipation that the 2006 free agency period would in fact be
hamstrung by this shortened amortization period. See Kaplan, Chaos and Compromise,
supra note 17, at 1. Furthermore, when also considering the owners' fear of losing the
salary cap forever, which became an increasingly likely scenario as the March 3 deadline
rapidly approached and was then extended, the combination of these two issues
undoubtedly created significant leverage for the players union, and ultimately played a
critical role in compelling the owners to surrender to the demands of the union. See id.
217.
Daniel Kaplan, NFL No Closer to Solving its Double Trouble, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Oct. 10, 2005, at 3; Kaplan & Mullen, NFL Owners to
Hear,supra note 207, at 4; Kaplan, On the Brink?, supra note 213, at 19; Kaplan & Mullen,
Two Issues, supra note 212, at 4.
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that the League must reach a revenue sharing deal before committing
to a new labor agreement. 218 The union's rationale for this position is
based on the belief that low-revenue teams are unlikely to approve
any new CBA if they are unsure about whether the owners' own
revenue sharing structure will address the financial inequalities that
currently plague the NFL. 219 Moreover, the players union is further
complicating negotiations by insisting that it should have some input
in the revenue sharing debate because the players have a stake in
220
maintaining the League's overall competitive parity.
Therefore, despite reaching an apparent compromise to share
total football revenue with players, both sides of the labor negotiations
remain sharply divided over exactly how much total revenue should be
guaranteed to players. While this tentative agreement would resolve
the NFLPA's concerns regarding the sharing of local revenue, the
current dispute over percentages appears serious enough that it might
preclude both parties from ultimately achieving their tentative
arrangement. Furthermore, despite some disagreement among
owners, there has been no indication that the League is seriously
considering any immediate reforms to the sharing of revenue between
221
teams.
Instead, the League has placed an emphasis on accomplishing
a new labor agreement before addressing any reforms to the revenue
sharing model. This approach by the League, however, could
potentially have devastating consequences for lower-revenue teams. In
particular, if the League relents to the NFLPA's demands and
ultimately guarantees the players sixty-one percent of "total football
revenue" for the 2006 season, the salary cap would jump from its
current level of $85.5 million per team to slightly more than $100
million. 222 Therefore, if the League reaches a new labor agreement
without implementing any reforms to the current revenue sharing
system, such a dramatic increase in the salary cap would be
devastating for lower-revenue teams because they are already
struggling to keep pace with the annual increases to the current
salary cap. 223 Furthermore, if this scenario becomes a reality, higher218.
Kaplan, NFL Owners Told, supra note 204, at 34.
219.
Id.
220.
Kaplan, On the Brink?, supra note 213, at 19.
221.
The new last-minute CBA and revenue sharing reforms, which were approved
just before this note went to press, indicate that the owners were ultimately forced to agree
upon revenue sharing reforms in order to placate the NFLPA and thereby reach a new
CBA that maintains the current salary cap system.
222.
King, supra note 204, at 86.
223.
See discussion supra Part III.B.1 describing the failure of the salary cap, and
the inability of lower-revenue teams to keep pace with the increases in the cap, and further
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revenue teams will enjoy an even greater advantage because they will
be able to directly utilize their unshared local revenue to corner the
market for talented free agents, which would thereby destroy the
League's competitive parity.
IV. FOURTH AND GOAL: SUPPLEMENTAL REDISTRIBUTION - A
PROPOSED REFORM TO THE NFL's REVENUE SHARING SYSTEM

On the one hand, there is no doubt that the NFL's collective
approach to its revenue sharing system played an integral part in the
continually growing success and popularity of the League as a whole.
On the other hand, the existence of some unshared revenue is also
undeniably important in today's economy because it provides
incentives for teams to market themselves. Forcing the individual
teams to share all of their local revenue would not be beneficial for the
League as a whole because it would completely eliminate any
incentive for teams to seek a competitive advantage, thereby enabling
some teams to simply coast on the coattails of their more committed
brethren.
Maintaining the status quo, however, is also not an option
because the extreme economic disparities that exist between high and
low revenue teams will soon render the future economic viability of
the lowest-revenue teams untenable. Furthermore, the owners cannot
avoid reforming the current revenue sharing system because the
NFLPA demands a portion of unshared revenues. If the NFL does not
accede to these demands, it could face a player strike, thereby
devastating the League's popularity and success. Therefore, in order
to maintain the incentives provided by unshared local revenue while
at the same time preserving the basic revenue sharing structure that
has so adequately proved the test of time, the NFL and its owners
should consider an economic formula that redistributes some portion
of the unshared local revenue from those teams on top to those at the
bottom.
Although the League has been largely unsuccessful in the few
attempts that it has made to neutralize some of the harmful effects
associated with the growth in unshared local revenue, it is important
to carefully consider the limited action that the NFL has taken
because it is helpful in providing guidelines for a more comprehensive
reform of the revenue sharing system as a whole. First, it is important
to identify the two major competing interests that must be balanced

recognizing that some lower-revenue teams are already forced to spend as much as seventy
percent of their revenue on player salaries under the current salary cap.
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by any attempt at reform, namely: (1) the need for some unshared
revenue to provide incentives for teams to market themselves; and (2)
the need to preserve the basic revenue sharing structure that has
fostered the success and popularity of the League by ensuring enough
parity to establish the correct competitive balance among the
individual NFL teams.
Analyzing the G-3 Program adopted by the NFL to help finance
the construction of new stadiums provides valuable insights that help
to identify a number of different issues that must be addressed by any
reform. First, it illustrates the importance that stadium ownership
plays in the ability of an individual franchise to capitalize on sources
of local revenue, and it indicates that stadium ownership will have to
play a role in any future attempt at reforming the revenue sharing
system. Second, the G-3 Program demonstrates both the inefficient
effect that "Franchise Free Agency" can have on the League as a
whole, and it indicates that those members of the League in a
decision-making
position clearly place significant value on
maintaining franchises in all of the major television markets.
Furthermore, the program's favorable treatment of the largest-market
teams also indicates that the League has not been overly concerned
with addressing the widening revenue gap, and instead has focused
more of its attention on maximizing total League revenue regardless
of the potential effect on revenue disparities. Finally, by relying on
financial incentives to keep teams in all of the major television
markets, the G-3 Program highlights the League's perception of its
own inability to prevent individual franchises from relocating without
an antitrust exemption from Congress.
The lessons to be learned from the League's "supplemental"
revenue sharing pool are much more straightforward, and can be
simply characterized as a lesson in the current inequalities that exist
between those teams on the top and those at the bottom. The basic
idea behind the NFL's "supplemental" revenue sharing pool is to
redistribute income so as to funnel the necessary funds to those teams
that cannot keep pace with their wealthier counterparts. If it were
not for the enormous revenue discrepancies between NFL teams, this
basic approach would be very effective in eliminating the economic
inequalities that currently exist in the NFL. However, because the
growth in local revenue has far outpaced the amount of funds
allocated to the "supplemental" pool each year, the effectiveness of this
approach is seriously compromised. Therefore, in order to adequately
address the large scale of the inequalities that have resulted from the
growth of unshared local revenue, the League should redistribute
some of the unshared revenue from those teams on top directly to
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those teams at the bottom. By taking a sufficient portion of local
revenue from revenue-rich teams and directly redistributing that
money to the teams with the greatest needs, the League can
effectively shrink the revenue gap, and thereby help to ensure the
relative competitiveness of less profitable teams.
By adopting the basic redistributive approach of the
"supplemental" revenue sharing pool, the League can efficiently
shrink the current revenue gap while at the same time minimizing the
impact that it will have on the incentives created by the existence of
sources of unshared revenue. Furthermore, one minor addition to the
basic approach of the "supplemental" revenue sharing pool will enable
the League to minimize the revenue gap in a way that is even more
consistent with the incentives provided by local revenue. This would
be a benchmark limit on the total amount of local revenue that can be
freely retained by an individual team in any given year. Instead of
placing a firm limit on the total amount of local revenue that a team
can utilize in that year, the benchmark will serve as a trigger in the
redistributive formula. When a team's annual local revenue exceeds
the benchmark limit, it will trigger a percentage that will be applied
against all of the local revenue in excess of the benchmark limit. For
example, if a team exceeds the benchmark limit by ten million dollars,
then a percentage of that ten million dollars will be allocated to the
"supplemental" revenue sharing pool, which will then be redistributed
to those teams with the greatest needs. Additionally, the
"supplemental" pool can also be used to allocate funds to the players
union, which will appease the concerns expressed by the NFLPA
224
regarding their demands for an increased share of local revenue.
Finally, this approach will allow the League to engage in the
necessary amount of redistribution without significantly impairing the
incentives that are created by unshared local revenue.
V. THE POST-GAME SHOW: A CONCLUDING SUMMARY

For over forty years, the NFL's collective "League Think"
philosophy has played a central role in establishing and maintaining
the competitive balance that fostered the massive popularity and

224.
Recent CBA negotiations have yielded a tentative agreement between the
League and the NFLPA to share "total league revenue" with the players, which would
include local revenue when calculating the percentage of League revenue guaranteed to
players. If the next CBA does in fact share "total league revenue" with the players, it will
render this issue moot. See discussion supra Part III.D.1 describing the recent
developments in the on-going labor negotiations, and the implications that these
developments will have on revenue sharing reform.
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success still enjoyed by the League today. In particular, the League's
two-pronged revenue sharing system has proven the test of time by
adapting to the prevailing economic forces that have helped shape the
course of the NFL's financial model. While the emergence of too much
unshared local revenue currently poses a variety of threats to the
League's continued financial and competitive stability, local revenue is
not by nature a corrosive force. If properly harnessed, local revenue
can help the League's financial model evolve by incorporating the
increased incentives that should enhance the League's overall product
as individual owners strive to improve the marketability of each
individual franchise. However, when unchecked, the lure of unshared
local revenue can entice an individual owner to maximize his own
benefits at the expense of the League as a whole. Under these
circumstances, the individual owners benefiting from local revenue
are often blinded by their own success, and they fail to recognize that
the success of their individual franchise necessarily depends on the
success of the League as a whole.
The League's revenue sharing system was originally designed
to ensure that the League's success always came before that of an
individual franchise. However, when the development of new economic
forces threatened the sustainability of this collective principle, the
League's financial system was forced to evolve. For example, the
salary cap was adopted in 1994 to help sustain the competitiveness of
the League's overall product by combating market inequalities that
revenue sharing alone could no longer control. Similarly, the NFL's
current financial system, which includes both revenue sharing and the
salary cap, is not adequately suited to address the threats posed by
the excessive growth of local revenue. This enormous growth of local
revenue has now combined with natural market inequalities like
market size and stadium ownership to create a widening revenue gap
between the richest and poorest teams. The expanding nature of this
revenue gap now threatens the competitive balance that has
previously ensured the sustained success of the League's overall
product, and must therefore be addressed before inflicting irreparable
harm upon the popularity and success of the League. In order to
adequately address these growing revenue disparities, the League's
financial system must once again evolve by incorporating a
redistributive formula that maintains a proper level of unshared local
revenue, and redistributes excessive local revenue to those teams most
in need. Much like the creation of the salary cap, the adoption of this
formula will help the NFL's financial system improve by
simultaneously capturing the positive incentives associated with a
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healthy level of local revenue, while also preventing the corrosive
effects of excessive local revenue.
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